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ALIMONY AND THE BIGAMIST: A COMMENT ON
SECTION 1140-a OF THE NEW YORK

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT

p iaop to 1940, the concept of alimony awards in matrimonial actions in New York State had been crystallized
by legislative enactment and judicial decision into well
known and definitive molds. It was well settled that alimony
was a periodic allowance payable to an innocent wife from
her husband's estate as a result of disorganization of the
matrimonial relation which resulted in divorce or separation.1 Such allowance was either temporary or permanent.
A temporary allowance would be awarded the wife during
the pendency of a divorce or separation action; the permanent award ensued upon/he success of the wife in prevailing
as a plaintiff. By the express terms of the statutes, permanent alimony was awardable to the wife only where the
underlying action was for divorce or separation. 2
I N. Y. Civ. PR~c. AcT § 1169 as it existed prior to 1940 provided: "In
an action for divorce or separation, the court, in its discretion, during the
pendency thereof, from time to time, may make and modify an order or orders
requiring the husband to pay any sum or sums of money necessary to enable
the wife to carry on or defend the action, or to provide suitably for the education and maintenance of the children of the marriage, or for the support of
the wife, having regard to the circumstances of the respective parties."
2N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1170 as it existed prior to 1940 provided: "Where
an action for divorce or separation is brought by either husband or wife, the
court, except as otherwise expressly prescribed by statute, must give, either in
the final judgment, or by one or more orders, made from time to time before
final judgment, such directions as justice requires, between the parties, for the
custody, care, education, and maintenance of any of the children of the marriage, and where the action is brought by the wife, for the support of the
plaintiff ...

.
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In annulment proceedings the rules were, of necessity,
different due to the peculiar nature of an action to annul a
marriage. Here, as the decree established that no marriage
at all had existed, no award of permanent alimony could be
made; the judicial attitude was that in the absence of express statutory mandate the authority was lacking.3 This

rule was applied in hard and fast strictness-regardless of
the necessity of the wife or the wrong of the husband, and
without the guilt or innocence of the wife operating as a
factor in the establishment of a norm. Alimony pendente
lite would be granted to a defendant wife in equity, as an
incidental and necessary power to exercise properly juris-

diction over the action, where she affirmatively asserted the
validity of a marriage 4 and lacked funds to defend the suit. 5
On the other hand, were she bold enough to be plaintiff, no

award of temporary support could be made due to the judicial conviction that this would be equivalent to approbation
of an inconsistent position on the part of the plaintiff, for
by bringing the action the plaintiff wife asserted that no
marriage existed; yet, she was seeking the attribute of a
marriage-support-in

ance.(

demanding such temporary allow-

This position was attributable to a judicial failure

to discern that the seeking of" support by the putative wife

while awaiting final determination of her claim was not

3 Park v. Park, 24 Misc. 372, 373, 53 N. Y. Supp. 677 (Sup. Ct. 1898)
("The foundation of the right to alimony being the duty of the husband to
support his wife . . . obviously, if the woman be not his wife, she can have
no claim to alimony. . . . Upon principle, there can be no provision for aliand the Code does not authorize it.")
mony in a decree of nullity ....
4 Higgins v. Sharp, 164 N. Y. 4, 8, 58 N. E. 9, 10 (1900)
("The power
to allow alimony and counsel fee to the wife in order to enable her to live
pending the action, and to present her defense, if she has one, must be regarded as incidental and necessary in all matrimonial actions. Without such
power the rights of the woman in many cases, could not be adequately
Brinkley v. Brinkley, 50 N. Y. 184 (1872); Griffin v. Griffin,
protected.")
47 N. Y. 134 (1872); North v. North, 1 Barb. Ch. 241 (N. Y. 1845).
5 Erlanger v. Erlanger, 173 App. Div. 767, 159 N. Y. Supp. 353 (2d Dep't
1916) Oppenheimer v. Oppenheimer, 153 App. Div. 636, 138 N. Y. Supp. 643
(1st Dep't 1912).
6 Sweet v. Sweet, 132 Misc. 386, 220 N. Y. Supp. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1928);
Kellogg v. Kellogg, 122 Misc. 734, 203 N. Y. Supp. 257 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
Jones v. Brinsmade, 183 N. Y. 258, 76 N. E. 22 (1905) ; Bloodgood v. Bloodgood, 59 How. Pr. 42 (N. Y. 1880); Bartlett v. Bartlett, 1 Clarke Ch. 460
(N. Y. 1841).
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necessarily inconsistent. Such temporary allowance could
well have been regarded as a welfare or protective measure,
of short duration, while the validity of the claim was probed.
Certainly she would have been entitled to support from the
husband without the bringing of an action-at least as to
necessaries.7 Nevertheless, judicial conservatism prevented
the taking of the step. The prevailing views were summed
up by the Court of Appeals in Jones v. Brinsmade:8 ,,.. it
seems both unjust and inconsistent that a wife should be
allowed alimony and counsel fee out of her husband's estate
to establish the invalidity of her marriage, on the theory
that by virtue of the marriage relation the husband is bound
to provide for her, when if she is successful in that suit her
status will be the same as if she had never married him."
New York was not alone in this position. By the overwhelming weight of authority in the United States, the
bringing of the action by the wife barred her from claim of
support. Only when she was defendant and the existence
of the marital relation was in dispute-and there was no
clear and convincing evidence against the existence of the
marriage-would an award be made. 9
Some of the hardship under these rules called for reform. The Law Revision Commission of New York devoted
its efforts to a survey of the problem and in 1940 recommended to the New York State Legislature sweeping changes
which affected the entire field of alimony allowances. 10
Among the principal recommendations of the Commission
was the proposed new Section 1140-a of the Civil Practice
Act, which was adopted and became a law effective September 1, 1940, thus becoming part of New York's first statutory
authorization for the allowance of alimony in annulment
actions.
7 For these latter views, see Gore v. Gore, 44 Misc. 323, 89 N. Y. Supp.
902 (Sup. Ct. 1904), aff'd, 103 App. Div. 74, 92 N. Y. Supp. 634 (3d Dep't
1905) ; Allen v. Allen, 59 How. Pr. 27, 8 Abb. N. C. 175 (N. Y. 1880), which
at the time were recognized as the minority views.
8 183 N. Y. 258, 263, 76 N. E. 22, 24 (1905).
9Huffman v. Huffman, 51 Ind. App. 330, 99 N. E. 769 (1912); Ricard
v. Ricard, 143 Iowa 182, 121 N. W. 525 (1909); Gard v. Gard, 204 Mich. 255,
169 N. W. 908 (1918) ; Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N. W. 379 (1906).
'0 N. Y. LAw REVISiON ComessioN REPORT, LEiss. Doc. No. 65 (H)
(1940).
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Section 1140-a provides:
When an action is brought to annul a marriage or to declare the
nullity of a void marriage, the court may give such direction for
support of the wife as justice requires. Such direction may be made
in the final judgment in such action, or by one or more orders from
time to time before final judgment. Upon the application of either
the husband or wife, upon notice to be given as the court shall direct,
the court may annul or modify such direction, or in case no such
direction shall have been made, in a judgment hereafter given, may
amend it by inserting such direction. This section shall apply to
any action brought by either the husband or the wife or by any
other person in the lifetime of both parties to the marriage.
Analysis of the added section discloses three principal
situations in which it is applicable. First, temporary 11
alimony is now awardable to the wife whether she be plaintiff or defendant. Second, permanent alimony is clearly
awardable where she is the plaintiff and successful. Third,
due to the express wording of the section, permanent* alimony may be awardable even where the wife is defendant
and loses the action, for the statute declares: "This section
shall apply to any action brought by either the husband or
the wife ... " Tentatively, and until further judicial interpretation, no too serious objection can be taken to the award
of temporary alimony in cases where the wife is plaintiff or
defendant-regardless of her innocence or wrongdoing. And,
where the wife is plaintiff and successful, and the fault was
that of the husband and the marriage was of appreciable
duration, an award of permanent alimony can well be regarded as proper, if for no other reason than to compensate
for lost opportunity. Where the husband is the wrongdoer
he should bear the burden. It is with the third possible
situation that fault, if any, must be found; that injustice,
despite care and vigilance, may creep in. May a wife
11

At the same time that § 1140-a was added to the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act,

§ 1169 of the N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act which theretofore provided for temporary

alimony only in divorce and separation actions, was amended to include annulment actions within its scope. However, the provisions of § 1140-a (". . . such
direction (for support) may be made in the final judgment in such action, or
by one or more orders from time to time before final judgment") seems also
to authorize temporary alimony.
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against whom a legal impediment to marriage exists, and
who with knowledge of the impediment enters into a marriage, and later brings action to annul the marriage with
her innocent spouse, still receive an award of permanent
alimony despite her wrongdoing? This question remained
unanswered until the decision in Johnson v. Johnson.12
In the Johnson case, the Court of Appeals passed on the
meaning and effect of Section 1140-a of the Civil Practice
Act in affirming the award of permanent alimony in an action where a legal impediment to a valid marriage ezisted
solely against the wife.
In this action, suit was originally commenced by plaintiff wife against defendant husband on a complaint in which
she sought a separation. Defendant interposed an answer
in which he counterclaimed for an annulment upon the
ground that at the time of the marriage alleged in the complaint, plaintiff was still the wife of another. At Special
Term (Walsh, J.),18 a separation was granted; defendant's
counterclaim was dismissed; and, plaintiff was awarded
alimony for her support in addition to support for a child
of the parties. On appeal,' 4 the Appellate Division (2d
Dep't) modified the judgment on the law and on the facts,
and affirmed as modified, the provision for permanent alimony. In so modifying, plaintiff's complaint for separation
was dismissed, and defendant was awarded judgment on his
counterclaim for annulment.
The Appellate Division
adopted defendant's proposed findings that, "the marriage
of the parties hereto was and is void, under Section 6,
Domestic Relations Law; that it be declared void ab initio
... and that defendant is entitled to judgment on the counterclaim .... " Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, held,
per Fuld, J., all of the justices who took part therein concurring, judgment of the Appellate Division affirmed.
The basis of the affirmance by the Court of Appeals lay
in the interpretation of the provisions of Section 1140-a.
12295 N. Y. 477, 68 N. E. (2d) 499 (1946).
13

Not officially reported.

14Johnson v. Johnson, 270 App. Div. 811, 59 N. Y. S. (2d) 698 (2d Dep't
1946).
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The court, in answering the contention of the defendant
husband that the Legislature had intended the statute to
apply only to an award of permanent alimony against a
bigamist husband and not to a case where the wife was the
bigamist, said:
True enough, the prime evil which the Commission sought to
remedy was the unhappy plight of the innocent wife married to a
bigamist husband; under the law as it then existed, she could terminate this undesirable and illegal relationship only at the cost of relinquishing all claim to support, while the offending husband could,
at his pleasure, avail himself of the invalidity of the marriage-void
because of his own misdeed-and slough off the financial responsibilities which he had voluntarily assumed...
Moreover, the statute is not, by its terms, limited to cases where
the wife is the innocent party; such a limitation would certainly be
most unreasonable and unjust, for example, in the case where the
marriage is voided because of the wife's insanity. (Cf. Bancroft v.
Bancroft, 288 N. Y. 323.) To escape such a result, the draftsmen
and the Legislature eschewed the rigidity of a mandatory "direction
for support" subject to an ironclad limitation. Instead, they left it
to the court's own discretion in all cases, granting the court power
to "give such direction . . .as justice requires."
Phrased in general fashion the provision is sufficiently broad to
cover such a case as the present, and direction for support of the wife
on the-record before us cannot be said to have been an abuse of discretion.
It seems manifest that the court felt that it was carrying out the intent of the Legislature as prompted by the
Law Revision Commission. It is submitted that there is at
least room for doubt on this score, and that the decision may
well pave the way for the substitution of an annulment
action in place of the illegal and discredited suits for breach
of promise, alienation of affection, seduction, etc., which
were swept away by our Legislature in 1935 15 as a direct
result of the public outcry against the scandals attendant
upon such actions. It was then legislatively recognized
that innocent persons were being victimized-through the
instrumentality of the judicial process-by "unscrupulous

15 N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT

§ 61-a-I.
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persons for their unjust enrichment" which resulted in
humiliation and pecuniary damage to many innocent persons
and in the perpetration of gross frauds 16-to say nothing of
17
the resulting reflection on the courts.
We have in the principal case the situation where a
bigamist wife has successfully received permanent alimony
from a court of equity although the facts as found established her to be the sole wrongdoer. The decision did not
rest upon estoppel and that rule was not invoked-nor was
it adverted to. Here the wife alone was guilty of the criminal act which invalidated the purported second marriage.
This holding can best be appreciated by comparison of the
language of the Law Revision Commission in its study on
the matter: "Neither the good faith and innocense of the
wife in contracting the marriage nor the nature of the relation which has in fact existed between the parties can at
present be considered." I" Nevertheless we are told: "...
the statute is not, by its terms, limited to cases where the
wife is the innocent party; such a limitation would certainly
be most unreasonable and unjust . . . 19

Apparently, the

former law was bad because the innocent wife was denied
relief; to remedy this mistake we are now to penalize the
innocent husband and award the fruits of the decision to
the guilty wife. By legitimate inference certainly the good
faith of the husband at the time of the marriage should also
be considered; because it can be fairly assumed that the
Legislature did not intend to shift the burden of a legal
wrong from the wife in an annulment action over to the
husband. It is submitted that before such a radical change
is declared to be in existence, clearer proof of such intent
should be found than there is in the words of the statute as
it exists. Construction such as this results in aid to a wrongdoer; this is an anomaly in the law which heretofore, at

Is N. Y. Civ. Piuc. Act § 61-a.
Fearon v. Treanor, 273 N. Y. 645, 8 N. E. (2d) 36 (1937).
Is N. Y. LAw REvIsIoN CommisSION REPoRT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65 (H) 9
37

(1940).
9

2 Johnson v. Johnson, 295 N. Y. 477, 68 N. E. (2d) 499 (1946).
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least, has refused its aid to those enmeshed in a criminal20 or
illegal transaction because of their own culpable fault.
The Commission also stated in its report: ":Nor does the
law recognize that the State may have an interest in compelling the husband to contribute to the support of a wife
who may be incapable of maintaining herself and the children of the marriage." 21 Obviously, the Commission was
referring to the danger of the wife becoming a public charge.
Again, it was noted: "It encourages relationships which
the law condemns, both by relieving a husband who contracts
a bigamous marriage of the financial responsibility which
he voluntarily assumed and which he ought to be estopped
to deny, and also by requiring the wife, who discovers the
invalidity of the marriage, and wishes to terminate the marriage to give up all claim to support." 22
It is reasonably fair to assume that the Commission had
in mind the good faith of the wife in contracting the marriage, the danger of her becoming a public charge, and the
thought that where the impediment existed against the husband he should be estopped from asserting the invalidity of
the marriage, so that the wife could terminate the relationship without giving up all claim for support. In view of
these fair and just principles it is somewhat difficult to determine precisely what lent the wife in the Jonson case to the
solicitous commendation of the court-save and except that
a reading of the trial record reveals that she was "married"
to the defendant for sixteen years. To accept this as the
basis for the award however is to argue that a meretricious
relationship, if continued long enough, is the equivalent of
a valid marriage. That this poses a moral and social problem evidently matters little-as does the seeming fact that
the benefits of marriage may be obtained without a marriage
existing at all. This convenient solution will, no doubt, free
many from the perplexities attendant upon the procuring of
20 Watts v. Malatesta, 262 N. Y. 80, 186 N. E. 210 (1933) ; Riggs et al.
v. Palmer
et al., 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
2
1N. Y. LAW RE-VISION COMMISSION REPORT, LEGIS. Doc. No. 65 (H) 9
(1940).

22N. Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, LEais. Doc. No. 65 (H)

10 (1940).

9,
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a valid foreign divorce. Divorces would not be necessary if
this trend is carried to its logical (or illogical) extreme.
All the benefits of marriage can be obtained without being
free so to contract, or, if free, by not so contracting at all.
At any time the relation may be dissolved by unilateral
action and the benefits gathered by a strained construction
of laws passed by a beneficent Legislature--which, on the
other hand, has steadfastly refused to lower the barriers to
permit divorce in New York on grounds other than adultery.
The question is squarely presented: Should judicial sanctity
be given to the relationship merely because the parties go
through a marriage in form only? Will this lead to a discouragement or to an encouragement of the illegal relationship? As a result of this decision cannot a woman enter
into a bigamous marriage, or one which she knows can be
surely annulled, and when she finally tires of the relationship, bring an annulment action and, surrounding herself
with a false aura of pity and sympathy, ask and finally be
awarded permanent alimony? The desired result is thus
achieved; instead of receiving a lump sum as was the result
in the former abolished action for breach of promise, she
may now receive a handsome annuity or pension. True, it
can well be argued that the discretionary power of the court
will prevent such happenings or abuses and that it was the
credulous juries in the now abolished actions that were the
ones that made the awards possible. But this too begs the
question for, if the juries are to be blamed, should not the
judges who, with our statutory safeguards, failed to act? 23
It is likewise reasonably evident that the award in the
Johnson case was not based upon the theory that the plaintiff wife was likely to become a public charge. A reading of
the trial record discloses that she was not in danger of becoming such, for, by her own admissions, at the trial, she
had on deposit in banks at the time of the motion for temporary alimony and counsel fees at least 510,000, and had a
fair expectancy of receiving a substantial sum in addition
thereto. Neither is there any finding in the case that the
23

N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 549, 457-a.
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plaintiff contracted the bigamous second marriage in good
faith, although, in substance, she did testify that she thought
her first marriage was not a marriage at all, and had not at
the time realized that she had gone through a marriage
ceremony. She stated substantially that she thought she
was going to the marriage license bureau only to procure a
license and that somewheres in the hustle and bustle she
ended up by being involved in a marriage ceremony-though
she did not realize its nature. This chronicle is highlighted
by the interesting fact that she was accompanied by her
brother, presumably of mature years and experience, and
another relative. It should be borne in mind that two witnesses are necessary for a civil ceremony of marriage. Suffice
it to say, that although the plaintiff was upheld by the trial
judge in her contention that no prior valid marriage had
taken place because of lack of intent on her part to enter
into the ceremony, this conclusion was set aside by the Appellate Division and an opposite finding substituted therefor.
If it be argued that she innocently believed she could contract a valid second marriage and therefore came within the
good faith and innocence notion suggested by the Law Revision Commission, can it be said that the defendant husband was acting in bad faith? Or, is his innocence and
good faith to be utterly disregarded and not a fact or circumstance to be considered? Certainly, it is reasonable to
suppose that this information on the prior marriage would
ordinarily come only from those who best knew about it,
principally his wife. This again is highlighted in the Johnson case for neither of the appellate tribunals invoked the
'doctrine of estoppel against the defendant husband and thus
seemingly acquitted him of fault.
In conclusion-and retrospect-it must be agreed that
the law in New York prior to the amendments and additions
of 1940 was in many respects harsh and unwise in its treatment of the innocent wife who was without funds. Harsher
still was the rule which relegated her to charity or to assistance of friends if she prosecuted her suit and was victorious.
To the loser then went the spoils; the victor was actually the
vanquished.
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The efforts to ameliorate this unpleasant situation however should not go so far as to award every wife-regardless
of fault of the husband-a permanent share of such husband's income. Such a remedy should exist only where the
equity in favor of such an award is clear, imperative, and
compelling-for after all, it is still true that the basis of
every annulment action is to deny the existence of a valid
marriage. To award the attributes of a cherished and honorable estate to the morally blemished is to substitute the profane for the sacred; to award such attributes to situations
where no marriage in fact existed, and such lack of validity
was due to bigamy or other serious wrong of the wife, and
where no element of estoppel can be found against the husband, coupled with the fact that there is no danger of the
wife becoming a public charge, is to cheapen the value of
marriage, and may well prevent the successful remarriage
of the innocent husband who cannot well afford to support
two wives at once, and to open once more the doors of our
courts to the conniving and unscrupulous. This would be
tantamount to a renewal of our once bitter experience.
It is submitted that the Johnson decision represents a
dangerous and unworkable proposition which should be
rectified in short order by legislative action or by a stricter
and less liberal interpretation of the annulment alimony
statutes by our courts. This would not be retrogression; it
would merely restate the most fundamental rule of equitythat he who comes there must come with clean hands.
CHARLES M. SPARACIO.

St. John's University School of Law.

